The Moral Status of Persons.
Perspectives on Bioethics.
BECKER, Gerhold K. (Ed.)
Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA, 2000, VII, 246 pp.
Value Inquiry Book Series 96
Studies in Applied Ethics (SAE)
"… offer[s] new and challenging perspectives on what a person is, not only by critically analysing a series of ideas in the bioethical discourse on personhood, but also drawing on the ethical legacies of Eastern cultures and Christianity… Few volumes in bioethics have such a diverse international authorship …[has] significantly expanded the intellectual horizons on the concept of personhood and thus made a valuable contribution to applied ethics in general … fascinating"
Medical Humanities Review, Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 2000
The advances in molecular biology and genetics, medicine and neurosciences, in ethology and environmental studies have put the concept of the person firmly on the philosophical agenda. Whereas earlier times seemed to have a clear understanding about the moral implications of personhood and its boundaries, today there is little consensus on such matters. Whether a patient in the last stages of Alzheimer's disease is still a person, or whether a human embryo is already a person are highly contentious issues.
This book tackles the issue of personhood and its moral implications head-on. The thirteen essays are representative of the major strands in the current bioethical debate and offer new insights into humanity's moral standing, its foundations, and its implications for social interaction. While most of the essays approach the issue by drawing on the rich intellectual tradition of the West, others offer a cross-cultural perspective and make available for ethical consideration the philosophical resources and the wisdom of the East. The contributors to this book are highly recognized philosophers, ethicists, theologians, and professionals in health care and medicine from East Asia (China, Japan), Europe, and North America.
The first part of the book probes the foundations of personhood. Examining critically the main theories on personhood in contemporary philosophy, the authors offer alternatives that better respond to contemporary challenges and their implications for bioethics.
The focus of the second part is firmly on the Confucian relational concept of the person and on the social constitution of personhood in traditional Japanese culture. While the essays challenge the individualistic features of personhood in the Western tradition, they lay the foundations for a richer concept that holds great promise for the resolution of moral dilemmas in modern medicine and health care.
The third part of the book enters into a dialogue with the Christian tradition and draws on its spiritual heritage in the search for answers to the contemporary challenges to human dignity and value. Its focus is on the Catholic social thought and Lutheran theology.
The fourth part addresses the moral status of persons in view of specific issues such as the effects of brain injury, gene therapy, and human cloning on personhood. It extends the scope of research beyond human beings and inquires also into the moral status of animals.
Contents: Editorial Foreword. Acknowledgments. Gerhold K. BECKER: The Moral Status of Persons: Introduction. PART I: FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONHOOD. ONE Ruiping FAN: Can We Have a General Conception of Personhood in Bioethics? TWO Johannes H.C. SUN: Are All Human Beings Persons? THREE Michael QUANTE: Personal Identity as Basis for Autonomy. PART II: EASTERN PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONHOOD. FOUR Chad HANSEN: Why Chinese Thought is Not Individualistic: Answer 1 of n. FIVE Edwin HUI: Jen and Perichoresis: The Confucian and Christian Bases of the Relational Person. SIX Shin OHARA: We-Consciousness and Terminal Patients: Some Biomedical Reflections on Japanese Civil Religion. SEVEN Renzong QIU: Reshaping the Concept of Personhood: A Chinese Perspective. PART III: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONHOOD. EIGHT Dennis P. McCANN: “Made in the Image and Likeness of God”: The Concept of the Person in Catholic Social Teaching and Its Implications for Health Care Policy. NINE Friedrich-Wilhelm GRAF: “The Worth of a Person” - A Speciesist Prejudice? Theological Comments on the Current Controversy over Bioethical Concepts. PART IV: THE BOUNDARIES OF PERSONHOOD IN HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH. TEN Ruth CHADWICK: Gene Therapy and Personal Identity. ELEVEN Jonathan K.L. CHAN: Human Cloning, Harm, and Personal Identity. TWELVE Derrick K.S. AU: Brain Injury, Brain Degeneration, and Loss of Personhood. THIRTEEN Elizabeth TELFER: Using and Benefitting Animals. About the Contributors. Index.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
Derrick K. S. Au, Chief of Service, Department of Rehabilitation, Kowloon Hospital, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.
Gerhold K. Becker, Chair Professor, Department of Religion and Philosophy, and Director of Centre for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.
Ruth Chadwick, Professor of Moral Philosophy, and Head of Centre for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, U.K.
Jonathan K. L. Chan, Assistant Professor, Department of Religion and Philosophy, and Research Fellow of Centre for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.
Ruiping Fan, Co-Managing Editor, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
Friedrich-Wilhelm Graf, Professor of Theology, Institut für Systematische Theologie, Evangelisch-theologische Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany.
Chad Hansen, Chair Professor of Chinese Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.
Edwin Hui, Associate Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Spiritual Theology, Regent College, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
Dennis P. McCann, Wallace M. Alston Professor of Bible and Religion, Department of Bible and Religion, Agnes Scott College, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.
Shin Ohara, Professor of Ethics, School of International Politics, Economics and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan.
Renzong Qiu, Director of Program in Bioethics, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China.
Michael Quante, Assistant Professor, Philosophisches Seminar, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster, Germany.
Johannes H. C. Sun, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan.
Elizabeth Telfer, Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, U.K
Recognized only a few decades ago as a relevant discipline of ethics, applied ethics is now firmly entrenched in teaching and research. It has become a valuable resource for decision-making in politics, science, and the professions. It has thus given substance to the belief that ethics can and should make a significant contribution toward a better and more fulfilling life.
Applied ethics seeks to provide moral guidance in the disturbing complexity of modern society by paying special attention to detail and context in moral issues, by connecting problems with moral theory, and by interpreting them in the light of established moral principles. This approach is reflected in the proliferation of sub-disciplines, of which bioethics, business ethics, and environmental ethics are the most prominent examples.
In view of the research profile of applied ethics and its public significance, a new Special Series for Studies in Applied Ethics has been established within the Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS) and is co-sponsored by the Centre for Applied Ethics at Hong Kong Baptist University. The new Special Series will publish scholarly work on issues within the whole range of subject areas in applied ethics, including moral theory and methodology. Preference will be given to comparative studies in applied ethics, to multicultural approaches, and to research that draws on and makes available for critical reflection and moral discourse the ethical resources of the East, particularly of China.
The present book is the first volume in the new Special Series. It aptly illustrates the editorial philosophy of the program by providing thirteen probing studies on the moral notion of personhood and its implications for issues ranging from health care to human cloning and the moral status of animals. The book assembles voices from China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, from Japan, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Linking contemporary controversies with fundamental values, the contributors draw on the moral resources of East and West, of Christianity and non-Christian religions, and are thus able to offer fascinating new perspectives on one of the most enduring and difficult problems in applied ethics. Uniting the best traditions of thought and reflection from the East and West, they provide sensitive insights, expand our understanding of morality, and advance the cause of humanity.
Gerhold K. Becker
Special Series Editor
Studies in Applied Ethics
Gerhold K. Becker
Ever since John Locke cut loose the conceptual strands that held together the personal and biological dimensions of humanity and assumed that not all human beings may be persons, the question, what makes human beings so special in the hierarchy of beings and accords them moral status, has dominated moral philosophy. The issue is particularly pressing in view of advances in reproductive technology, medical genetics, and life sustaining treatments that have challenged some of the traditional intuitions and cherished beliefs about the sanctity of human life and the foundations of its moral dignity. The ability of modern medicine, for example, to sustain life even in the absence of higher brain functions due to congenital malformations (as in anencephalic newborns), or when those functions have been permanently lost due to injury or disease, has been seen as the vindication of the moral dissociation, in the Lockean tradition, of human life from personhood. According to this view, it is personhood, not human life, that accords moral status and requires respect. By understanding “person” as a forensic term for the appropriation of actions and their merit (Locke, 1975, II, 27, § 26), Locke effectively replaced the traditional substantive concept of personhood encompassing all human beings and signifying their ontological nature with a nominal concept, whose meaning and significance is determined by the (shifting) purposes of practical discourse. While concurring with Locke’s rejection of a substantive concept of personhood, Immanuel Kant disagreed with his account of personhood in terms of subjective acts of consciousness. In Kant’s view, moral accountability presupposes freedom and the ability to follow the moral law. What gives a person absolute worth is the autonomy of the will under the moral law. “Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws” (Kant, 1996, p. 378).
In today’s popular usage, “person” and “human being” still have largely the same extension; the restriction of moral status to personhood has thus raised more questions than it answered. The controversy about the definition of death and its moral (and legal) implications is a case in point. A patient in the last stages of Alzheimer’s disease may no longer be someone who meets all the requirements of personhood, but to his wife he is still her husband and to his daughter her father, whose life has not yet come to its end.
Traditionally, the moral significance of personhood was derived from and grounded in an intellectual discourse which blended the Christian theology of Creation with the Greek metaphysical teleology of the hierarchy of beings. Created in the image of God, humanity was endowed with rationality and assigned a unique place in nature. Humanity’s uniqueness and qualitative superiority over the rest of creation was anchored in the rational soul, which was both the source of biological life and of personal individuality. This concept of personhood encapsulated a theological doctrine about human life and its destiny based on the faith in a personal God, whose Incarnation in Christ revealed the mystery of his own Trinitarian nature. Thus the sanctity of human life and the dignity of human personhood, while not identical, became synonymous expressions of respect for the divine act of Creation. The gift of life signified the ontological status of human beings called to participate in the life of God, as well as the moral task that equally demanded moral recognition for all beings created in God’s own image and individual moral perfection.
While this Christian heritage remains an influential and inspiring factor in the contemporary debate on personhood, the fragmentation of philosophy and the secularization of modern life have undermined the foundations of a substantive conception of personhood which could be universally shared. As participants in the modern debate, we have lost the authoritative frame of reference the Christian world-view once provided; we are, in the words of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., no longer “moral friends” but have become “moral strangers” to whom “content-full” moralities are no longer available and who, instead, must opt for a morality which derives its authority exclusively from the agreement of those involved (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 73).
If this is a correct description of the current state of affairs, contemporary moral discourse is faced with the formidable task of securing and reformulating the fundamental intuitions about human worth and the moral status of persons within a new framework of thought that can neither completely ignore nor fully endorse the assumptions and beliefs of the intellectual tradition within which the concept of personhood originated. This calls, above all, for conceptual clarification and careful analysis of the term and its different usages in moral discourse before its normative implications can be explored. One of the major issues then concerns the question, how the meaning of the term “person” can be established if its usage differs widely among the participants in the moral discourse and is not restricted to a particular cultural tradition. Since the substantive definition of personhood has been replaced by functional definitions, it is usually taken for granted that “person” stands for an assembly of identifying properties or characteristics. While most lists are anchored in a strong conception of rationality, they offer no unified set of criteria of personhood. They may, or may not, provide even for the extension of personhood in one or both directions, below and above the traditional levels of human beings, thus encompassing non-human animals as well as extra-terrestrials.
Depending on the set of criteria, personhood may in the foreseeable future even be attributed to what falls into neither category: artificial devices of high complexity such as thinking super-computers like that charming little fellow by the name of HAL in Stanley Kubrick’s and Arthur C. Clarke’s well-known movie, 2001: A Space Odyssey. HAL felt so strongly about the mission into space that he did not want it jeopardized by the unreliable human crew and began to kill all of them so as to put himself in command of the ship. In view of such fate we may consider ourselves lucky that, with 2001 just around the corner, the prediction of such machines was a little too optimistic and super-computers of this kind seem still a long way off. Nonetheless, if the conceptual core of personhood remains almost exclusively anchored in rationality, the day may come when the logic of the concept will compel us to grant person-status to the artifacts of our own hands created in our own image.
The question then arises, how we can determine which set of criteria is correct, and which properties should be included in the list, if outside the Christian tradition persons are no longer presumed to have real essences (Martin, 1998, p. 116). Furthermore, there is no consensus among philosophers and ethicists, whether any or all the listed properties must be actually possessed to qualify for personhood, or whether mere general capacities can suffice. Adopting either of these options, or even a combination of them, will lead to greatly different conceptions of personhood with serious consequences for individual human beings and animals alike. Depending on the set of properties selected, certain human beings may not be considered persons at all (“non-persons”), or they may no longer qualify as persons (“former persons”), or qualify only indirectly and not in their own right (“social persons”) (Engelhardt, 1996, pp. 146-151); they may even be considered “failed persons” (Rescher, 1994, p. 448). I agree with Michael Tooley that in deciding the correctness of these claims, “appeal to mere intuitions seems especially unpromising,” and nothing less than “making out a case for a systematic moral theory” will provide hope that this issue can be resolved (Tooley, 1998, p. 120).
In exploring the boundaries of moral personhood in an ever shrinking world, it is also necessary to transcend the confines of Western moral discourse towards other cultural traditions and their competing moral intuitions. Of particular interest are the great Eastern traditions of thought, which may both enrich and critique the idiosyncratic conception of personhood that has become the dominant factor in the moral discourse and extends to the political domain as well, particularly in the debate about human rights and their universality. Although the obvious political overtones of the so-called “Asian values” debate have cast doubts on the credibility of some engaged in this debate, the unbiased, critical exploration of personhood from the vantage point of non-Western, particularly Eastern cultures and intellectual traditions, is a genuine task.
A great number of such issues have been taken up by the authors of this book. The contributions to a critical understanding of the concept of personhood and the moral status of persons collected in this volume are representative of major positions in the contemporary debate. They draw as much on its Christian legacy as they critically transcend this frame of reference towards more encompassing and transcultural conceptions.
In the opening chapter, Ruiping Fan offers a systematic overview of major conceptions of personhood within and outside the Western intellectual tradition. Distinguishing two different types, he examines representatives of particular, “content-full” conceptions of personhood, which are, by their very nature, not universally available to all individuals or communities, and contrasts them with a general, transcendental conception. Fan holds that the “appeal to creation” conception originating in the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, the “appeal to rites” conception encapsulating the understanding of the human person in the Confucian tradition, and the “appeal to rights” conception (of which he discusses five different versions) are typical examples of the first type. He concludes that, while each conception has its merits within the limits of its specific discourse, none of them can qualify as a member of the second type of conceptions of personhood, since none is entirely suitable to constitute a non-parochial, general notion as required by the prevailing conditions of the contemporary situation of secular ethics. The only candidate that would, in Fan’s view, meet those requirements is a general, “content-less” conception of personhood (as proposed by Engelhardt) based on the analysis of the transcendental conditions of ethical discourse in a pluralistic society.
In contrast, Johannes H. C. Sun takes issue with bioethicists who answer in the negative what he takes to be the fundamental question under consideration, “Are all human beings persons?” Based on a critical analysis of various “liberalist” moral theories and their functionalist conceptions of personhood, Sun rejects them and argues that none of them can account for the fact that the development of properties of personhood presupposes the existence and recognition of the person; consequently, mere properties cannot be the ontological basis for the conferral of person-status on individuals. Thus he concludes that the demise of the substantive account of personhood was premature, since it alone can provide adequate foundations for human dignity and the protection of human life prior to any specific act of recognition by the social community.
Michael Quante approaches the issue of personhood from the perspective of the Lockean emphasis on personal identity and consciousness, and links it with theories of autonomy and freedom. Although he recognizes that “autonomy” has various semantic connotations, Quante claims that its ethically relevant meaning is, directly or indirectly, based on personal identity. Leading a life as a person presupposes self-consciousness and personal identity. He argues that, while autonomy is not a necessary but only a sufficient condition of personal identity, it is grounded in a “thick” concept of personal identity which provides it with “materialistic” elements by which limits can be set to extreme subjectivistic conceptions of ethics and bioethics.
Personhood issues usually arise from conceptual tensions within the Western tradition of thought and are rarely taken beyond this intellectual frame of reference. This contrasts with widely held popular expectations that outside this tradition issues of personhood, autonomy, and individuality may be more readily resolvable since they are not entangled in the thick web of metaphysical assumptions and religious beliefs that have been determining factors in the Western history of thought.
That this is a simplistic view and that the underlying issues are real and not merely a matter of different world-views or terminologies, is one important result of explorations into personhood from non-Western perspectives collected in this volume. Chad Hansen offers a diligent and succinct analysis of the differences that set apart Western and Chinese moral theories, and their resulting conceptions of personhood. He traces the differences back to diverging linguistic presuppositions and semantic theories, which underpin the non-individualistic moral theory typical of classical Chinese thought and its individualist counterpart in the Western tradition. Yet Hansen cautions that Western ethical individualism and Chinese non-individualistic conceptions of personhood are neither exclusive nor an indication of moral relativism. Both traditions are sufficiently complex to accommodate competing moral theories and should not be construed as posing insurmountable obstacles for reaching some form of consensus in their debate about human rights, human dignity, and human worth.
Edwin Hui takes a similar comparative approach and argues that the typical Western emphasis on rationality as the dominant feature of the concept of personhood is one-sided. It neglects, above all, relational conceptions, which played a major role in the formation of the concept of personhood in early Christian, particularly Trinitarian theology, and are of similar significance to the Confucian conception of humanity, or ren. In Hui’s view, the relational approach offers hope that the current impasse in the debate about personhood and its bioethical implications can be overcome and a more inclusive frame of reference be established, which might integrate relevant features of the Christian and Confucian traditions of morality.
A comparable conclusion is reached, albeit from different premises and from a specific Japanese perspective by Shin Ohara. Analyzing the individual-communal relationship in the context of Japanese family structure, Ohara concludes that the strong tendency to substitute the individual (“i-dentity”) for the communal (“we-dentity”) may reveal both the structural strength and the deficiency in traditional Japanese moral thought and thus call for the inclusion of moral resources from other traditions.
Without restricting his view to any Chinese moral tradition in particular, Renzong Qiu nevertheless approaches a variety of conceptual issues of personhood from a distinctly Chinese perspective. He argues that the recent advances in medicine and biotechnology and the resulting moral dilemmas expose the conceptual deficiencies of the Western theory of personhood, which is too narrowly defined by features of rationality and individual autonomy. Instead, he emphasizes the significance of the biological, psychological, and social (relational) dimensions as defining characteristics of personhood.
Theological reflections on personhood are presented from the perspectives of Catholic social teachings and Protestant (Lutheran) theology by Dennis P. McCann and Friedrich-Wilhelm Graf respectively. Analyzing major Church documents and papal encyclicals of the recent past, McCann seeks to elucidate the relevance of distinctively Catholic convictions and policy guidelines for a comprehensive understanding of personhood. In his view, Catholic thought succeeds in developing a strong and coherent conception of human personhood that is rooted in the biblical revelation and is interpreted within the framework laid out by the natural law tradition. This conception is equally capable of providing a critical view of the limits and possibilities of technological intervention in the natural processes of human development, and a position that can facilitate dialogue and collaboration with other traditions.
Graf takes issue with the reductionist tendency of contemporary bioethics along the lines of Locke and his almost exclusive focus on consciousness and the actual possession of person-defining properties. He claims that within such narrow focus it is neither possible to utilize, for the adequate understanding of personhood, the conceptual richness of other ethical traditions (such as Aristotelian, Kantian, Schleiermacherian, or Hegelian), nor to recognize the significant contribution of Jewish-Christian thought to the development of the modern concept of personhood. Graf makes a case for a concept of human personhood based on the metaphysics of freedom that equally applies to all human beings, recognizes the limitations of human freedom as an integral part of the history of human life, and acknowledges the religious foundations of human dignity and human worth. He holds that persons must be recognized as such from the beginning to the end of their lives while moral obligations may change and depend on the specific empirical conditions to which human persons are subjected.
In addition to broad conceptual issues which touch on the very foundations of Western moral thought and may even lead beyond, dramatic scientific and technological advances in biology and medicine have raised a variety of more specific concerns. It has, for example, been suggested that in the formation of personal identity, the individual genome essentially plays the role that is the secular equivalent of the metaphysical soul. Consequently, any interference with the human genome, and particularly its replication in cloning, would entail serious implications for personal identity and the individual person. Examining this and related claims, Ruth Chadwick argues that the tendency to equate the core self with DNA is mistaken and an underestimation of other crucial elements involved in the construction of human identity and personality. She emphasizes the need to clearly distinguish between the various interpretations of personal identity and their relationship to the biological constituents of human nature.
Jonathan K. L. Chan arrives at a similar conclusion, albeit from a different point of departure. Exploring the moral implications of human cloning he contends that objections based on the assumption that human cloning will cause physical and psychological harm to the clone and adversely affect his/her personal identity are flawed and, consequently, do not justify a comprehensive ban of human cloning as recommended, among others, by the influential U.S. National Bioethics Advisory Commission.
Derrick K. S. Au discusses personhood in the context of his own experience as a clinician who daily encounters patients suffering from the loss of important cognitive functions. The severe changes in the personalities of such patients raises the question of the relationship between mental incapacity and the potential loss of personhood. In Au’s view, severe impairments and mental dysfunctions are not sufficient reasons for the denial of person-status and of intrinsic value to those patients. Instead, he suggests that such tragic situations should be seen as opportunities to facilitate integration into a network of community relations and meaningful interaction, which help preserve the patient’s dignity and respect familial bonds.
The debate on personhood has raised fundamental questions about the coherence and validity of the concept and is no longer confined to issues which exclusively relate to the moral status of human beings. On the assumption that substantive conceptions of personhood can only claim relevance within particular, “parochial” moral communities and have to be replaced by functionalist definitions available to all participants in the bioethical discourse, the boundaries of personhood are thrown wide open. Views that accord rights and moral status only to human beings are increasingly challenged, and it has been argued that consistency among our moral beliefs can only be achieved if we recognize the moral status of animals resembling children in all relevant respects.
Elizabeth Telfer concludes the explorations into moral personhood presented in this volume by comparing the different ways of thinking about animals and human beings and by questioning the underlying assumptions about the exclusive worth of human persons. In her view, it is evident that animals have moral status and are worthy of moral considerations in their own right. Considering the implications such conferral of moral status on animals entails for the ways we may treat them, Telfer rejects not only the usual arguments for using animals for food, labor, and personal pleasure as pets, but also reasoning that seems to justify what she calls “benevolent” intervention in the lives of animals.
As the chapters in this volume confirm, issues of personhood and its moral implications have become controversial, and the lines in this debate are not always clearly drawn. Persons certainly have moral status, yet moral status may not be restricted to persons. The underlying reasons for conferring moral status on persons may no longer be as definitive as they were in a moral discourse within the parameters of Christianity and its distinct view on human life and its value. Some suggest that moral status may be due to beings who do not (or no longer) qualify for (full) personhood, and others even query the usefulness of the concept of personhood for bioethics generally. All contributors to this volume agree, however, on the need to critically reconstruct the fundamental insights at the center of the traditional concept of personhood so as to fully utilize them for the preservation of human dignity and the protection of all beings of moral standing.
Engelhardt, H. Tristram, Jr. (1996), The Foundations of Bioethics, second edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1996), The Metaphysics of Morals (1795). In: Mary J. Gregor (ed. and trans.), Practical Philosophy. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 353-603.
Locke, John (1975), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Peter H. Nidditch (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Martin, Raymond (1998), “Was Spinoza a Person?” In: Axel Wüstehube and Michael Quante (eds.), Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, pp. 111-118. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi.
Rescher, Nicholas (1994), “Replies to Commentators.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, pp. 441-457.
Tooley, Michael (1998), “Personhood.” In: Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, pp. 117-126. Oxford: Blackwell.